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[1]  The enduring value of the Constitution is the fundamental approach to 
human rights transcending time and technology.  The modern complexity 
and variety of electronically stored information was unknown in the 
eighteenth century, but the elemental due process concepts forged then can 
be applied now.  At some point, the accumulation of information 
surpassed the boundaries of living witnesses and paper records.  The 
advent of computers and databases ushered in an entirely new order,1 
giving rise to massive libraries of factual details and powerful 
investigative tools.  But electronically collected information sources are a 
double-edged sword.  Their accuracy and reliability are critical issues in 
the hands of prosecutors and their accessibility a hard-won necessity in 
preparing a defense. 
 
[2]  This article examines the use of computer databases and electronic 
evidence from both standpoints.  With limited guidance from federal and 
state criminal discovery rules, the courts have had to rely on constitutional 
principles and analogies to civil procedure when faced with database and 
                                                 
* Director of Legal Information Services, New York State Defenders Association.  J.D., 
Temple University School of Law, 1984; M.L.S. St. John's University, 1994; B.A., 
summa cum laude, St. John's University, 1981. 
1 According to a study by the U.C. Berkeley School of Information Management and 
Systems, the sum of “new” information stored electronically doubled between 1999 and 
2000, to five exabytes (five followed by 18 zeroes) or the equivalent of 500,000 Libraries 
of Congress.  See Grant Gross, Study Documents Data Boom: Data Storage Has Doubled 
During the Last Three Years, INFOWORLD, Oct. 28, 2003, available at http: 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/10/28/HNstoragedoubles_1.html. 
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electronic document discovery requests.2  A tension exists between the 
government’s proprietary interest in preserving the sanctity of its 
databases and the right of the defense to assail the accuracy of the 
databases’ output or to use them as investigative tools.  As the gold 
standards of forensic science have come to be questioned,3 so too the 
inviolability of government databases must be rethought.4  And the 
defense’s right to prepare its case and receive a fair trial makes it 
                                                 
2 See generally Federal Judicial Center, Materials on Electronic Discovery: Civil 
Litigation, 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openform&url_l=/public/home.nsf/inavge
neral?openpage&url_r=/public/home.nsf/pages/196 (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) 
(providing several links, articles, presentations, and other items of interest on e-
discovery); The Sedona Conference, http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/faq 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009) (stating that among the aims of this research and educational 
institute is the advancement of electronic document retention and production).  To 
achieve these aims, the Sedona Conference specifically noted:  
 
Working Group 1 was formed in Spring of 2002 and issued a public 
comment version of The Sedona Principles addressing electronic 
document production in March of 2003 - a month later, the Principles 
were cited by the Federal Judicial Center’s Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee Discovery Subcommittee as one of the reasons to focus on 
possible amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in this 
area. 
 
The Sedona Conference: What Have Working Groups Achieved so far in Contributing to 
the Advancement of Law and Policy, http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/faq 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009). 
3 See generally Simon Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings 
From Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189 (2004) 
(arguing that forensic evidence has gained its legitimacy through legal acceptance rather 
than scientific validity); Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability and 
Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2 
(2005) (arguing that scientific problems should render firearms and toolmark 
identification inadmissible in court); Ken Strutin, Criminal Law Forensics: Century of 
Acceptance May Be Over, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 8, 2008, at 5 (“The gold standards of forensic 
science are losing their luster.”).  
4 Robert Garcia, “Garbage In, Gospel Out”: Criminal Discovery, Computer Reliability, 
and the Constitution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1043, 1073 (1991) (“Computerized information 
may be wrong, incomplete, or misleading due to mechanical failure, mistake, fraud, or 
bias.  Ultimately, people are responsible for any errors, and there are infinite ways in 
which people can make mistakes, commit fraud or reflect bias.  Broad discovery may 
be necessary to track down the reliability problems and evaluate the reliability of the 
computerized information.”).  
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necessary to use database knowledge comparable to the prosecution.  
Much of this information is generated solely by the government or its 
experts.  The civilian alternatives are prohibitively expensive, inadequate, 
or non-existent.5  This review will highlight the problems created by 
disparities in resources and the role of constitutional and procedural 
remedies in the future development of criminal electronic discovery. 
 
[3]  The discussion is divided into several areas, beginning with an 
examination of the benefits of database discovery in criminal practice 
under Part I.  Part II is an analysis of the small body of criminal electronic 
discovery cases involving databases and the rules that have been applied 
over the years.  Parts III and IV analyze the constitutional foundations for 
defense access to government database tools under due process, 
compulsory process and the right to confrontation.  Applications of these 
theories are illustrated through developments in DNA database discovery 
in Part V, which highlights challenges to the quality of data and the right 
to access DNA databanks for defense investigation.  The issues that arise 
in challenging evidence derived from databases, particularly data relied on 
by experts, are discussed in Part VI.  The ongoing problem of achieving 
defense parity with prosecution resources and the constitutional grounds 
for overcoming objections to disclosure or access to database information 
is considered in Part VII.  Finally, the conclusion, Part VIII, considers the 
enormity of the task facing advocates as the criminal justice system, and 
society at large, come to terms with this next wave in the Information 
Revolution. 
 
I.  ELECTRONIC FOOTPRINTS 
 
[4]  A fact of modern life in the twenty-first century is the electronic 
footprint.  Our choices and movements leave digital traces—the results of 
making life more convenient.  These traces also impact the administration 
of justice in unforeseen ways. 
 
[5]  Facing a murder charge in federal court arising from the shooting 
death of a government witness in the Bronx, Jason Jones informed police 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., People v. Evans, 534 N.Y.S.2d 640, 643 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (providing an 
example of why such alternatives are inadequate).  
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that he was innocent.6  He claimed that at the time of the shooting he was 
riding the bus from his job at a manufacturing plant in Yonkers to cash his 
paycheck and then took the subway to visit his girlfriend.7  It was a classic 
alibi defense, except for the witness, his MetroCard.8 
 
[6]  The card was still in his wallet when he was arrested.9  Once his 
lawyer’s investigator made use of it, the foundations of his innocence 
claim took shape.10  The New York City Transit authority provided a 
report of Jones’s movements on the bus and subway, miles away from the 
crime scene, based on the unique serial number from his MetroCard.11  
Along with a punch card from his job and his image captured on a 
surveillance camera when he went to cash his paycheck, the credibility of 
Jones’s alibi defense supported reexamination of his bail status—
eventually leading the prosecutors to agree to his release upon posting 
bond.12 
 
[7]  The city’s database of transit records, along with the other 
documentation of Jones’s activities that night, gave the defense an 
invaluable and nearly unimpeachable source of exculpatory evidence.  It is 
only one example of the power that databases can have in the prosecution 
and defense of criminal cases.13 
                                                 
6 See Benjamin Weiser, Murder Suspect Has Witness that Doesn’t Lie: A MetroCard, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, at A1.  
7 Id. 
8 The MetroCard is a payment system for travel on New York City buses and subways.  
Each card has a magnetic strip that records the amount of money or time remaining on 
the card.  A centralized computer system stores data on where and when each card is used 
based on information it retrieves from buses and subway turnstiles.  Id. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
11 Id.  
12 See United States v. Jones, 583 F. Supp. 2d 513, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The 
Government, after reviewing the Documentary Evidence, agreed to consent to a bail 
package for Jason Jones, and Magistrate Judge Katz approved the bail conditions on 
October 15, 2008.”).  
13 See, e.g., Madison Park, E-ZPass Details Popping Up in Trials: Toll Records Leave 
Trail for Officers, BALT. SUN, Aug. 31, 2007, at 1B:  
 
E-Z Pass [sic] was first used in New York in 1993, and today there are 
9 million users who rang up more than 2 billion transactions in 2006, 
according to the E-ZPass Interagency Group, an Atlantic City, N.J., 
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[8]  In Jones’s case the New York City Transit Authority complied with a 
defense request to supply a travel log of his movements.14  As the 
decisional law shows, however, requests for access to government, and 
especially law enforcement databases, are often an uphill battle. 
 
II.  DATABASE DISCOVERY 
 
[9]  The constitutional underpinnings of criminal justice require the 
prosecution to produce reliable and material evidence of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.15  The accused has the rights to confrontation, cross-
examination, and compulsory process.16  Increasingly, both sides are 
looking toward nonhuman sources of information in preparing their cases.  
Databases in a raw sense are an extension of human memory and 
computational ability.  It is only natural that they have become powerful 
and increasingly common witnesses in many prosecutions.  
 
[10]  Some of the largest government and private databases in the world 
have information directly relevant to the administration of justice.  
According to Business Intelligence Lowdown, Sprint, with over 53 million 
subscribers, “processes more than 365 million call detail records and 
operational measurements per day;” YouTube has more than 45 terabytes 
[trillion bytes] of videos; ChoicePoint harvested 250 terabytes of personal 
data on 250 million people; venerable AT&T has 323 terabytes of 
information and 1.9 trillion phone call records; and the U.S. Customs 
database contains “information on hundreds of thousands of people and 
objects entering and leaving the United States borders.”17 
                                                                                                                         
organization comprising 23 agencies in the 12 states where the system 
is in use. 
 
Id. 
14 Weiser, supra note 6.  
15 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“Lest there remain any doubt about the 
constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due 
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged.”).  
16 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
17 Mini Singh, Top 10 Largest Databases in the World, BUS. INTELLIGENCE LOWDOWN, 
Feb. 15, 2007, 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 3 
 
 6
[11]  Law enforcement databases go even further.  There are forensic 
databanks of identifying information such as fingerprints, DNA and 
ballistics,18 and more data collected by the IRS, SEC, DEA and other 
agencies.19  An example of the direction in which these databanks are 
moving is the resource created to assist law enforcement in locating 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.businessintelligencelowdown.com/2007/02/top_10_largest_.html (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2009). 
18 See, e.g., Robin Bowen & Jessica Schneider, Forensic Databases: Paint, Shoe Prints, 
and Beyond, 258 NAT’L INST. JUST. J., Oct. 2007, at 34, 38, available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/219603h.pdf (summarizing a study conducted by West 
Virginia University surveying government and private forensic databases used in law 
enforcement).  It is important to observe their qualification of this research: “[t]he 
National Institute of Justice has not evaluated the utility, accuracy, or veracity of the data 
in these databases; no product approval or endorsement by the U.S. Department of Justice 
should be inferred.”  Id. at 38.  
19 See Garcia, supra note 4, at 1065. 
 
The government hopes to combine sophisticated information retrieval 
and expert systems with electronic databases, spy satellites and other 
technological marvels to fight drug trafficking, money laundering, tax 
evasion, and other crimes.  The government has established a 
computerized financial crimes and money laundering control center 
that will integrate the databases of more than half a dozen federal and 
state agencies, including Customs, the Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA), the IRS, the Federal Reserve, and the State Department.  The 
Counter Narcotics Center based at Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
headquarters, created in 1989, includes agents from the FBI, the DEA, 
the NSA, the Defense Department, the State Department, and the Coast 
Guard. 
 
Id.; see also National Information Exchange Model (NIEM), http://www.niem.gov/ (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2009).  
 
NIEM, the National Information Exchange Model, is a partnership of 
the U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland 
Security.  It is designed to develop, disseminate and support enterprise-
wide information exchange standards and processes that can enable 
jurisdictions to effectively share critical information in emergency 
situations, as well as support the day-to-day operations of agencies 
throughout the nation.  
 
Id. 
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cannabis cultivation by using geographic data systems and knowledge 
bases.20  
 
[12]  Computers in the 1960s had barely moved from vacuum tubes to 
solid-state circuitry when the first criminal prosecutions relying on this 
technology were brought.21  Still, these machines were powerful enough to 
serve federal prosecutors at this early stage of modern computing and 
addressed discovery issues that remain unresolved.22 
 
[13]  In 1967, the defendants in United States v. Dioguardi23 had been 
accused of fraudulently transferring and concealing property of a 
bankruptcy.24  This case relied heavily on an analysis of sales figures, 
purchase orders, assets and inventories.25  Government witnesses used a 
computer program to collect the data and compute their findings to 
support their theory of the case.26   Although the U.S. attorney provided 
the defense with printouts of their calculations, the defense objected and 
asked for the actual program.27  Despite arguments that the information 
constituted Jencks Act material28 and the printouts were hearsay, the court 
denied the defense discovery motion.29 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Finding the Marijuana Fields: A Computer Points the Finger, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 6, 1987, at A33  
(discussing the early work of scientists at the United States Geological Survey and in the 
private sector who have developed a computer mapping program that uses data on “land 
ownership, distance from towns, transportation routes, water sources, natural vegetation, 
elevation, sunshine angle and slope of the land”).  Information from this database would 
figure prominently in probable cause and suppression matters.  See id. 
21 See generally Carol Iaciofano, Computer Timeline, in DIGITAL DELI 20, 26-27 (Steve 
Ditlea ed., 1984) (noting the prosecution of the first computer crime in 1964, and the first 
federal case in 1966). 
22 See, e.g., United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1970). 
23 428 F. 2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1970). 
24 Id. at 1034.  
25 Id. at 1037. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (2006): 
 
After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct 
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the 
United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the 
witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 3 
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[14]  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
observed that there was a fundamental right to discovery underlying the 
defense request:  
 
We fully agree that the defendants were entitled to know 
what operations the computer had been instructed to 
perform and to have the precise instruction that had been 
given.  It is quite incomprehensible that the prosecution 
should tender a witness to state the results of a computer’s 
operations without having the program available for 
defense scrutiny and use on cross-examination if desired.  
We place the Government on the clearest possible notice of 
its obligation to do this and also of the great desirability of 
making the program and other materials needed for cross-
examination of computer witnesses, such as flow-charts 
used in the preparation of programs, available to the 
defense a reasonable time before trial.30 
 
[15]  Nonetheless, the court affirmed the conviction.31  Defense counsel 
failed to raise their32 best grounds for relief until their reply brief on 
                                                                                                                         
subject matter as to which the witness has testified.  If the entire 
contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the 
testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly 
to the defendant for his examination and use. 
 
Id.; see also Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957):  
 
[T]he criminal action must be dismissed when the Government, on the 
ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce, for 
the accused’s inspection and for admission in evidence, relevant 
statements or reports in its possession of government witnesses 
touching the subject matter of their testimony at the trial.  The burden is 
the Government’s, not to be shifted to the trial judge, to decide whether 
the public prejudice of allowing the crime to go unpunished is greater 
than that attendant upon the possible disclosure of state secrets and 
other confidential information in the Government’s possession. 
 
Id. (citation omitted).  
29 Dioguardi, 428 F.2d at 1038.  
30 Id. at 1038. 
31 Id. at 1040. 
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appeal, i.e., testing the validity of the program and preparing for cross-
examination of the witness.33  In other words, they did not preserve the 
issue in the district court by specifying the grounds for their motion—
instead they focused too much on their Jencks argument.  Also, they were 
not prejudiced by the trial judge’s decision to deny access.  This was a 
case of punch cards versus adding machines.  The calculations were 
simple, the data set limited and the computer’s operations verifiable by 
tabulators or manually during the course of the trial or pending appeal.  At 
the same time, defense counsel did not renew or clarify their motion or 
seek a subpoena for the information during the trial.34 
 
[16]  Forty years later, the data relied on in criminal prosecutions and the 
computing power needed to manage them can exceed a defendant’s ability 
to realistically challenge the prosecution without adequate discovery.35  
Even when discovery is provided, the volume and nature of the response 
can be overwhelming and debilitating.36  Today, computer discovery 
cannot be characterized as simple or limited.  Data and documents are 
being produced in soaring and unmanageable numbers.37  As a result, the 
risk of prejudice to the defense has grown proportionately.38  
 
[17]  Confronted with a lengthy indictment charging securities fraud, the 
defendants in United State v. Ferguson39 filed a bill of particulars seeking 
specification of the false statements, false documents and fraudulent 
scheme at the heart of the case. 40  In accordance with Rule 16 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,41 the prosecutors turned over 3.5 
                                                                                                                         
32 Two individuals served as counsel for the defendant-appellants in this case.  Id. at 
1034. 
33 Id. at 1038. 
34 Id. at 1039. 
35 See George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System 
Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶¶ 4, 6 (2007).  
36 See id. ¶¶ 15-18 (providing an example of how discovery documents can become 
voluminous and unmanageable).  
37 See id. ¶¶ 9-10.  
38 Id. ¶ 23.  
39 478 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D. Conn. 2007). 
40 Id. at 225. 
41 18 U.S.C. Rule 16(a)(1)(E)-(F) (2006) (defining a defendant’s right to seek access to or 
a copy of “books, papers, documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or 
places” and “results or reports of any physical or mental examination and of any 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 3 
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million pages of discovery “in the exact same electronically searchable 
format that the government is currently using.”42  When the defendants 
were arraigned, they received 1,350 pages of “hot documents,” 
representing the most important information relevant to the allegations.43 
 
[18]  As in Dioguardi, prejudice was not found.44  The government’s 
response was sufficient to overcome the need to speculate about which 
materials might be relevant from millions of documents or unspecified 
allegations.45  While denying the defendant’s request for a bill of 
particulars, the court identified three important disclosure requirements: 
(1) a detailed accusatory instrument; (2) a full Rule 16 disclosure in an 
organized format, such as a searchable database; and (3) a list or 
identification of the “most relevant” documents.46  These guidelines are a 
good starting point for measuring the responsiveness of the prosecution’s 
discovery obligations.  The next step involves search methodology.  
 
[19]  When an employee in the Department of State in Canada was 
indicted for allegedly accepting gifts in exchange for expediting visa 
applications from a business owner, STS Jewels, for his workers, a federal 
judge in the District of Columbia ordered the government to search its 
print and electronic files for responsive information.47  The discovery 
order covered information about visa applications, requests for expedited 
interviews, and decisions.48  The files were located in six different 
consulates in Canada and Mexico.49 
 
[20]  The scope of the search was justified by the defense’s theory that 
STS applications were similar to other routine expedited requests granted 
                                                                                                                         
scientific test or experiment,” among other things, that the government possesses, 
provided it meets the other statutory criteria).  
42 Ferguson, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 226. 
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 227; see United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1970). 
45 See Ferguson, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 227. 
46 Id. (“Given the degree of detail in the indictment and the government’s provision of 
searchable discovery databases and a list of its key documents, the defendants have not 
proven that they require more particularization to adequately prepare their defenses, 
avoid prejudicial surprise at trial, and protect against future double jeopardy.”).  
47 See United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 15-16, 24 (D.D.C. 2008).  
48 Id. at 16. 
49 Id.  
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without any incentives.50  The defendants’ request specified the 
methodology: “[F]or each location searched, defendants demand a 
comprehensive description of all of the sources that were searched (both 
paper and electronic), how each source was searched, and who conducted 
the search.”51  The search was designed to be thorough, beginning in 
electronic sources and extending back to archival print files.52  It included 
“active servers” and “backup tapes,” the parameters extended to “all 
email” and “stand-alone electronic documents” stored on “shared drives, 
personal drives and hard drives,” and the search terms were “early or 
expedite* or appointment or early & interview or expedite* & 
interview.”53  
 
[21]  The defendants objected to information produced in paper or 
electronically that did not identify the source or records keeper.54  They 
requested that the government create an index for the hard copy 
documents indicating the custodian, job title, source, format (paper or 
electronic), and Bates number.55  There was a gray area between print and 
computer files that made it impossible for the defense to make full use of 
the discovery or determine its completeness.56 
 
[22]  Without guidance from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 
judge looked to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for help.57  
                                                 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 17-18. 
54 Id. at 18. 
55 Id.  Bates numbering, or Bates stamping, is used to place identifying numbers and/or 
date/time-marks on images and documents as they are scanned or processed (for 
example, during the discovery stage of preparations for trial).  Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 161 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a Bates number as, “[t]he identifying number 
that is affixed to a document or to the individual pages of a document.”). 
56 See O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 16-18. 
57 See id. at 18-19:  
 
In criminal cases, there is unfortunately no rule to which the courts can 
look for guidance in determining whether the production of documents 
by the government has been in a form or format that is appropriate.  
This may be because the “big paper” case is the exception rather than 
the rule in criminal cases. 
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In civil cases, Rule 34 has been applied over the years to carve out 
methods for the form and format of documents in high volume paper (and 
now electronic) cases.58  It begins by requiring the producing party to turn 
over the records in the same manner as they were kept or categorized 
according to the discovery request: 
 
(E) Producing the Documents or Electronically 
Stored Information.  Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered 
by the court, these procedures apply to producing 
documents or electronically stored information: 
 
(i) A party must produce documents as they 
are kept in the usual course of business or must 
organize and label them to correspond to the 
categories in the request 59 
 
[23]  The judge recognized that the Rule’s purpose was to maintain 
“equality between the parties in their ability to search the documents.”60  
To be usable, the files produced had to be searchable.61  Moreover, their 
value as evidence depended on the defendants’ ability to authenticate 
them.62  Without knowing the author, custodian and source of the 
                                                                                                                         
Id.; In re Lees, 727 N.Y.S.2d 254, 254-57 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (stating defendant made 
an ex parte discovery request in rape case for access to complainant’s and third party’s 
computer for impeachment evidence granted under N.Y. Civil Practice Laws and Rules 
because no remedy existed under the Criminal Procedure law). 
58 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 19:  
 
It is foolish to disregard them [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] 
merely because this is a criminal case, particularly where, as is the case 
here, it is far better to use these rules than to reinvent the wheel when 
the production of documents in criminal and civil cases raises the same 
problems. 
 
Id.; see Floyd v. New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68798, at *1-2, *5-
6, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2008) (stating that plaintiffs in class action suit against NYPD 
over an allegedly race-based stop and frisk policy sought court ordered disclosure of 
records in the police database under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).   
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i). 
60 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 19. 
61 See id. at 20.   
62 Id.  
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documents, electronic or paper, the defense could not meet the 
authentication requirements of Federal Rules of Evidence 901.63  The 
magistrate judge took the step of recommending to the district court judge 
that all documents supplied by the government in response to the 
discovery request should be treated as authentic, avoiding the burdensome 
task of having the government certify everything under Rule 902(11).64 
 
[24]  The defense also challenged the thoroughness of the government’s 
search methods in the following ways: “1) not interviewing the employees 
as to their use of electronic means as a form of communication regarding 
expedited reviews, 2) not having the employees search their own 
electronically stored information and 3) not indicating what software [the 
government] used to conduct the search or how it ascertained what search 
terms it would use.”65  The alleged failure of the prosecution to use 
forensic indexing tools, commonly relied on by law enforcement, could 
have hampered the completeness and accuracy of the search 66 by, for 
example, overlooking email stored in .pst files.67 
                                                 
63 FED. R. EVID. 901 (“The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
matter in question is what its proponent claims.”).  The Notes of the Advisory Committee 
on Rules raised the problem peculiar to criminal cases, which did not have pretrial 
procedures for resolving this issue.  “Today, such available procedures as requests to 
admit and pretrial conference afford the means of eliminating much of the need for 
authentication or identification.  Also, significant inroads upon the traditional insistence 
on authentication and identification have been made by accepting as at least prima facie 
genuine items of the kind treated in Rule 902, infra.  However, the need for suitable 
methods of proof still remains, since criminal cases pose their own obstacles to the use of 
preliminary procedures, unforeseen contingencies may arise, and cases of genuine 
controversy will still occur.”).  FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee’s note. 
64 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 20. 
65 Id. at 22 (emphasis added).  
66 See, e.g., Amy Baron-Evans, When the Government Seizes and Searches Your Client’s 
Computer, CHAMPION, June 2003, at 19-20, available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ElecDi17.pdf/$file/ElecDi17.pdf (discussing 
the use of forensic software by law enforcement for searching computers).  
67 See generally About.com, PST (Personal Folders File), 
http://email.about.com/od/outlook/g/pst.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) (defining .pst, 
which stands for Personal Storage Table, as a filename extension associated with 
Personal Folders files used with certain Microsoft products to store data locally).  
Personal Folders (.pst) files are used to store local copies of messages, calendar events, 
and other items within Microsoft, Microsoft Exchange Client, Windows Messaging, 
Microsoft Outlook, and Microsoft Outlook Express.  Id. 
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[25]  Lack of preservation or spoliation of evidence68 might have been a 
legitimate concern, but no specific claims were made that would have 
borne out a due process violation.69  Metadata70 concerns, however, were 
also raised.71  The files produced were in PDF72 or TIFF73 image formats, 
which can obscure hidden file information.74  Only the native files 
contained the full metadata.75  Rule 34 speaks to the method used by the 
producing party to normally store the files.76  Since the request did not 
identify a particular format, the response was within the Rules: 
 
(ii) If a request does not specify a form for 
producing electronically stored information, a party must 
produce it in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily 
maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms; and 
                                                 
68 See United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 597 (6th Cir. 2003) (defining spoliation 
as “the intentional destruction of evidence that is presumed to be unfavorable to the party 
responsible for its destruction” (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1437 (8th ed. 2004)));  
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (implying that the 
“failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably 
foreseeable litigation” is inherent in the definition of spoliation (quoting West v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999))).  
69 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 22-23. 
70 Metadata is “information about a particular data set or document which describes how, 
when, and by whom the dataset or document was collected, created, accessed, or 
modified; its size; and how it is formatted.  Some metadata, such as file dates and sizes, 
can easily be seen by users; other metadata can be hidden from users but are still 
available to the operating system or the program used to process the data set or 
document.”  Barbara J. Rothstein et al., Managing Discovery of Electronic Information:  
A Pocket Guide for Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 24-25 (2007), available at 
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/eldscpkt.pdf/$file/eldscpkt.pdf.  See generally 
SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES & 
COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION & RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE 28-
29, 35 (2d ed. 2007) (explaining what metadata is, what it does, and how it may be 
useful). 
71 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 23. 
72 Portable Document Format (PDF) is a file format created by Adobe Systems for 
document exchange, and it is used for representing two-dimensional documents in a 
manner independent of the application software, hardware, and operating system.  
Rothstein, supra note 70, at 25.   
73 Tagged Image File Format (abbreviated TIFF) is a file format for storing images, 
including photographs. Rothstein, supra note 70, at 13.   
74 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 23.  
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
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(iii) A party need not produce the same 
electronically stored information in more than one form.77 
 
[26]  The sufficiency of the government’s response hinged on whether the 
files in an image format were “reasonably usable.”78  The magistrate judge 
admonished defendants to get a stipulation requiring the prosecution to 
preserve the files in their native format, and if the prosecution failed to 
agree, the magistrate judge suggested that the defendants seek a court 
order.79 
 
[27]  Lastly, the defendants criticized the search terms used to unearth the 
files.80  The magistrate judge considered this issue of such complexity that 
he suggested a defense challenge to their sufficiency must satisfy the 
elements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.81  
 
[28]  The use of proper search terms is probably one of the most difficult 
issues to litigate and solve.  Searchers must have insight into the language 
and terms of art, as well as the factual background of the case, to even 
begin formulating the correct queries.  Making a discovery request that 
captures the proper search terminology would be impossible without 
knowing the choice of vocabulary and syntax used by the government (or 
the creators of the documents or data).  This may be an appropriate 
situation for seeking the input and assistance of a defense expert in 
                                                 
77 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii)-(iii). 
78 O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 23.  
79 Id. at 23. 
80 Id. at 23-24. 
81 Id. at 24; see FED. R. EVID. 702:  
 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, 
if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the 
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database searching.82  As discussed in Part III, the defense should not have 
to rely on the prosecution’s skill in ferreting out exculpatory or mitigating 
information from a government resource.  No one but the defense can 
view evidence with an “advocate’s eye.”83 
 
[29]  In a money laundering case, an IRS agent testifying for the 
government prepared summaries and exhibits illustrating the contents of 
bank records.84  The prosecution used a computer program to run searches 
laying the foundation for the spreadsheets and other exhibits they planned 
to use.85  The defendants sought discovery of the financial database to 
assess the  “accuracy, completeness, and fairness” of the exhibits and 
evidence.86 
 
[30]  Denying the motion, the district court concluded that the “source 
material” or “underlying data” were the actual bank records—available for 
examination for three years.87  Giving the defense access to the 
prosecution database would reveal the search queries run by the agent, 
which the judge characterized as work product.88  The court added that the 
defense was “equally as capable” as the agent of examining the bank 
records to determine if the summaries were accurate89—and of course, 
they would have an opportunity for cross-examination.90 
                                                 
82 An expert in text searching (or a subject expert) can be drawn from any of several 
disciplines, such as information and computer science or linguistics.  See, e.g., Peter 
Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, The Linguist on the Witness Stand: Forensic Linguistics 
in American Courts, 78 LANGUAGE 221, 221 (2002), available at 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/language/v078/78.2solan.pdf (discussing the applications of 
linguistic expertise in civil and criminal cases and the courts’ views on admissibility). 
83 Cf. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (stating while the defendant may 
be denied the benefits of an “advocate’s eye,” partial disclosure is sufficient).  
84 United States v. Schmidt, No. 04-cr-00103-REB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30559, *1-2 
(D. Colo. Apr. 25, 2007).  
85 Id. at *2.   
86 Id.  
87 Id. at *3.   
88 Id.  
89 Id. at *4.  But see Portis v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 3139, 2004 WL 1535854, at *1, 
*4-*5 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2004) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action over custodial 
arrests for nonviolent ordinance violations, where the court granted the city’s motion for 
disclosure of the plaintiffs database drawn from municipal arrest records: “Because the 
court finds that the City has a substantial need for access to the database and that the City 
could not obtain the substantial equivalent of the database without the undue hardship of 
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[31]  The defense made a due process argument that the court rejected.91  
Still, in a case with voluminous records and a database created by the 
prosecution using undisclosed search terms, it would be extremely 
difficult to find the very same documents that the government relied on.92  
Because unearthing relevant, discoverable information in large databases 
can be problematic, partial or unguided disclosure is of little value.  And, 
while an incomplete database may be useful,93 it is not a substitute for full 
discovery. 
 
[32]  Uncontrolled searches of massive databases are like a right without a 
remedy.  Burying the defense in data (as opposed to paper) does not serve 
the ends of justice and wastes resources.  Full discovery must comport 
with due process and fulfill the constitutional mandates of compulsory 
                                                                                                                         
expending extensive, duplicative resources, the court compels production of the 
database.”).  The contents, a database of 20,000 arrest records, did not reveal mental 
impressions or litigation strategy and constituted fact, not opinion, work product.  Id. at 
*3. 
90 Schmidt, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30559, at *4; cf. Jules Epstein, The Great Engine that 
Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 
STETSON L. REV. 727, 729 (2007) (examining how exonerations and scientific studies 
have uncovered the shortcomings of cross-examination as a tool for ferreting out the truth 
of eyewitness identification, an issue that goes to the “integrity of the adversarial 
process”). 
91 Schmidt, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30559, at *3.  
92 Cf. Tessera, Inc. v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. C06-80024MISC-JW(PVT), 2006 WL 
733498, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2006) (“Accordingly non-party Hynix Semiconductor 
America shall produce on DVD-ROMS or hard drives documents derived using specific 
search terms from databases created for the U.S. Department of Justice investigation of 
the DRAM industry and any related preceding litigation in which the Hynix 
Semiconductor companies were a party.”) (emphasis added). 
93 See Omax Corp. v. Flow Int’l Corp., No. C04-2334L, 2007 WL 1830631, at *2 (W.D. 
Wash. June 22, 2007).  The district court ordered disclosure of an incomplete database: 
 
Though Flow may very well be correct that the “Project” database is 
incomplete and potentially unhelpful in explaining differences between 
initial price quotations and final sales prices, Omax is nevertheless still 
entitled to the information contained in the ‘Project’ database, at least 
as it relates to initial price quotations offered to customers and potential 
customers.  Though the data may be of limited value, it does have some 
value and it is relevant to Omax’s damages case. 
 
Id. 
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process and confrontation.  Without substantial guidelines on prosecutorial 
disclosure and expert assistance for the defense when needed, the ends of 
justice are not furthered.  
 
III.  RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE AND EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
 
[33]  Private database services can be expensive, and much of the 
government’s resources are not publicly accessible.  Still, due process, 
equal protection and the right to effective assistance of counsel require the 
state to provide funds for expert and investigative services for those 
without means, independent of their ability to afford counsel.94  Moreover, 
regardless of cost, an accused ought to have access to relevant and 
necessary resources in the exclusive possession or control of the state in 
furthering confrontation and compulsory process rights. 
 
[34]  In People v. Evans,95 Stanley Evans faced charges of arson for 
allegedly setting fire to two Chevrolet vans.96  In preparation for a hearing 
seeking dismissal of the charges (or in the alternative, trial), Evans asked 
the judge to order the New York City Police Department’s Auto Crime 
Division to provide an expert who could examine the nonpublic VINS.97  
                                                 
94 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). 
 
We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that 
his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at 
trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a 
psychiatrist’s assistance on this issue if the defendant cannot otherwise 
afford one. 
 
Id.  See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in 
a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1331-38 (2004) 
(discussing availability of expert witnesses to indigent criminal defendants); Edward C. 
Monahan & James J. Clark, Funds For Resources For Indigent Defendants Represented 
By Retained Counsel, Champion, Dec. 1996, at 16, 18 ("Clients are seldom going to risk 
trial with retained counsel if that means they must forfeit access to funds for experts, 
investigation and other services despite their real indigence."). 
95 534 N.Y.S.2d 640 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). 
96 Id. at 641. 
97 Id.  The vehicle identification number (VIN) refers to:  
 
The identifying code for [a] SPECIFIC automobile.  It is [a] car’s 
fingerprint.  It sets . . .  vehicles apart from the millions of vehicles out 
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His goal was to dispute ownership of the vehicles and uncover 
irregularities in the numbers.98  The motion, brought ex parte, was 
granted.99 
 
[35]  The Police Department asked the court to vacate the order.100  Citing 
the state’s obligation under Ake to provide expert services to indigent 
defendants and the accused’s right to compulsory process, the judge 
concluded:  
 
Where the government holds a monopoly of expertise on a 
matter that reasonably bears on a defense in a criminal 
action, due process requires that a defendant be afforded 
access to this expertise.  Such a rule places the defendant in 
the same position as the prosecutor because the district 
attorney unquestionably has the right to compel the police 
department auto crime experts to cooperate with the People 
in an appropriate case.101 
 
[36]  The only public source of the expertise was the NYPD’s Auto Crime 
Division.102  Private sources like the National Auto Theft Bureau and 
General Motors would not accede to Evans’ request.103  In addition, the 
judge observed that the ability of the defendant in this situation to hire an 
expert was irrelevant because “[w]hether or not he has funds to hire an 
expert, if the only source of expertise that may reasonably be necessary to 
                                                                                                                         
there.  Recently the VIN is reflected by 17 digit characters.  It displays 
a car’s uniqueness and manufacturer and provides a method to trace [a] 
car from the factory to the junk yard.  [A] VIN can be used to track 
recalls, registrations, warranty claims, thefts and insurance coverage.  
 
Vehicle Identification Number – VIN Numbers, What is a Vehicle Identification Number 
(VIN)?, 
http://www.vehicleidentificationnumber.com/vehicle_identification_numbers_vin_info.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). 
98 See Evans, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 641.  
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 641-42.  
101 Id. at 642 (internal footnote omitted). 
102 Id. at 641.  
103 Id. at 643.  
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his defense resides with the government, the government must give him 
access.  This is the essence of fairness.  Due process mandates no less.”104  
 
IV.  BRADY 
 
[37]  Evans began with a pre-trial request for expert assistance.105  Under 
Brady v. Maryland,106 the prosecution may have an affirmative obligation 
to utilize or reveal computer-based information or face severe sanctions 
for nondisclosure and lack of cooperation.107  The judge in Evans 
considered the potential problem of relying on the prosecution to conduct 
such investigations, and rejected the notion that the defense was “required 
to rest solely on the thoroughness and promptitude of the prosecutor.”108  
                                                 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 641.  
106 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
107 Id. at 87; see also United States v. Dollar, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1322 (N.D. Ala. 1998) 
(“All charges against both defendants will be dismissed with prejudice because the 
United States . . .  flagrantly, breached its unquestioned obligation to produce exculpatory 
and impeachment materials imposed by Brady v. Maryland.”) (citation omitted); cf. 
Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 255 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating dismissal with 
prejudice is not always an appropriate remedy for government failure to turnover results 
of an ATF database search without finding exceptional circumstances: “While retrial is 
normally the most severe sanction available for a Brady violation, where a defendant can 
show both willful misconduct by the government, and prejudice, dismissal may be 
proper.” (footnote omitted)).  
108 Evans, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 642 n.2.  Compare United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 14, 
29-30 (D.D.C. 1998) (“[O]pen-file discovery does not relieve the government of its 
Brady obligations.  The government cannot meet its Brady obligations by providing Ms. 
Hsia with access to 600,000 documents and then claiming that she should have been able 
to find the exculpatory information in the haystack.  To the extent that the government 
knows of any documents or statements that constitute Brady material, it must identify that 
material to Ms. Hsia.”), with United States v. Grace, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1080 (D. 
Mont. 2005): 
 
As it relates to the manner of production, Brady simply requires that 
information be produced in such a way that it will be of value to the 
accused.  The government’s production in this case complies with that 
requirement for at least two reasons.  First, the documents have been 
presented in a searchable format.  More importantly, over half of the 
documents presented -- 2,613,658 pages -- are actually Grace 
documents provided to the government during the Libby Superfund 
Clean-up litigation.  There is no reason to assume that the government 
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The Supreme Court’s holding in Kyles v. Whitley,109 underscores this 
point. 110 
 
[38]  Curtis Lee Kyles was sentenced to death for the murder of a 60-year-
old woman in a supermarket parking lot.111  His case rested largely on the 
testimony of an informant, who gave several inconsistent statements, and 
whose accounts raised suspicions about his involvement—all leading to 
serious potential challenges to eyewitness descriptions introduced at 
trial.112 
 
[39]  One element of the prosecution’s theory was that Kyles drove his car 
to the parking lot where the murder was committed—leaving it there as he 
drove away in the victim’s vehicle.113  That night when the police arrived 
at the scene, they took down the license numbers of all the cars parked 
there, assuming one of the cars belonged to Kyles.114  A computer printout 
of license plate numbers did not include Kyles’ car, but authorities failed 
to disclose this fact to the defense.115  At a minimum, disclosing this fact 
would have given Kyles’ attorney a basis to challenge a grainy photo 
supposedly showing the defendant’s car and contradict statements by the 
police informant who claimed to have picked up Kyles’ vehicle later on 
from that location.116  
                                                                                                                         
is better equipped through resources or knowledge to locate 
exculpatory documents than are the Defendants. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
109 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
110 See id. at 453 (“[T]he question is not whether the State would have had a case to go to 
the jury if it had disclosed the favorable evidence, but whether we can be confident that 
the jury’s verdict would have been the same.”).  
111 Id. at 419, 423.  
112 See id. at 450, 453.  
113 Id. at 423.  
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 428-29.  
116 Id. at 450.  
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V.  DNA DATABASES AND THIRD PARTY SUSPECTS117 
 
[40]  The Court in Kyles hinted at the value of exculpatory evidence that 
pointed the “arrow of inculpation”118 in another direction.119  The 
revelations in that case did more to indict the informant than the 
defendant.  Third party exculpatory information has gained importance 
and acceptance with the advent of DNA profiling.120  Since the U.S. 
government maintains the largest DNA databank in the world as part of its 
law enforcement operations,121 it makes sense that it could also be used in 
preparation of a defense based on an alternate suspect. 
 
[41]  There are only a handful of other countries with comparable 
resources, and none as extensive as the FBI database.122  The enormity of 
                                                 
117 There are a host of issues related to DNA discovery, access to post-conviction testing, 
and actual innocence claims that will not be considered in this article.  See generally 
Glenn A. Garber & Angharad Vaughan, Actual-Innocence Policy, Non-DNA Innocence 
Claims, 239 N.Y.L.J. 4 (2008) (stating that courts should review claims of innocence in 
non-DNA cases); Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629 
(2008) (arguing that appeals and post-conviction proceedings should review claims of 
innocence based on the “probative value of new evidence of innocence”). 
118 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 46 (1987) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 
502 A.2d 148, 153 (Pa. 1985)).  
119 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 450.   
120 See Steven Wisotsky, Miscarriages of Justice: Their Causes and Cures, 9 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 547, 548 (2007).  
121 “The CODIS Unit manages the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) and the 
National DNA Index System (NDIS) and is responsible for developing, providing, and 
supporting the CODIS Program to federal, state, and local crime laboratories in the 
United States and selected international law enforcement crime laboratories to foster the 
exchange and comparison of forensic DNA evidence from violent crime investigations.  
The CODIS Unit also provides administrative management and support to the FBI for 
various advisory boards, Department of Justice (DOJ) grant programs, and legislation 
regarding DNA.”  Federal Bureau of Investigation: CODIS, 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/html/codis1.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).  
122 The National DNA Index (NDIS) “contains over 6,539,919 offender profiles and 
248,943 forensic profiles as of December 2008.  Ultimately, the success of the CODIS 
program will be measured by the crimes it helps to solve. CODIS’s primary metric, the 
‘Investigation Aided,’ tracks the number of criminal investigations where CODIS has 
added value to the investigative process.  As of December 2008, CODIS has produced 
over 80,900 hits assisting in more than 80,900 investigations.”  Federal Bureau of 
Investigation: CODIS-NDIS Statistics, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009).  But see The National DNA Database, available at 
http://www.homeoffice.gov/uk/science-research/using-science/dna-database/ (last visited 
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this unparalleled resource is beyond the capacity of under-resourced 
defendants.123  The technology has advanced and improved over time, 
laying the groundwork for more post-conviction motions for testing or 
retesting biological evidence.  This becomes all the more important as the 
scope of databanks changes.124  
 
                                                                                                                         
Feb. 10, 2009) (showing that the United Kingdom National DNA Database is second 




123 See, e.g., Brian Bakst, Public Defenders Feel the Strain from Complex Courtroom 
Science, DULUTH NEWS TRIB., Feb. 27, 2005: 
 
While the use of DNA evidence has grown rapidly in recent years, 
public defenders’ expertise in the science has not. That’s why the 
Board of Public Defense is seeking $1 million for a team of specially 
trained attorneys, ready for dispatch around Minnesota on major cases 




124 Recently, the Department of Justice promulgated a rule expanding its DNA collection 
efforts to encompass arrestees.  See DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence 
Preservation in the Federal Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. 238 (Dec. 10, 2008) (to be codified 
at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28) (“This rule generally directs federal agencies to collect DNA samples 
from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted, and from non-United 
States persons who are detained under the authority of the United States, subject to 
certain limitations and exceptions.”); Spencer S. Hsu, New Rule Expands DNA Collection 
to All People Arrested, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2008, at A2 (“The change could add as 
many as 1.2 million people a year to the national database, U.S. officials said.”).  
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has been ordered to change its retention rules to exclude 
DNA belonging to “unconvicted persons.”  See In re S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 
App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (stating that permanent retention of 
DNA from innocent persons violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private . . . life . . .”); Richard Ford, 
Police Are Ordered to Destroy All DNA Samples Taken from Innocent People, TIMES 
(London), Dec. 5, 2008, available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article5289312.ece (“More than 1.6 
million DNA and fingerprint samples of innocent people on police databases must be 
destroyed after a court ruled yesterday that keeping them breaches human rights.”). 
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[42]  In the 2008 term,125 the United States Supreme Court will hear the 
case of William Osborne, convicted of kidnapping and assault in 1994, 
and sentenced to 26 years in prison.126  He has been seeking access to 
genetic material for retesting in the Alaska state courts.127  His aim is to 
apply modern techniques, unavailable at the time of his original trial, to 
the samples.128  Although many states have enacted laws permitting post-
conviction DNA testing, the Court must resolve whether there is a federal 
constitutional right to such testing.129  Moreover, the questions of whether 
a defendant would have the right to access the database to test existing 
genetic material or seek a sample from a third party for testing has yet to 
be resolved.130  This right would have its basis in the compulsory process 
clause, under the rubric of the right to present a defense.131 
 
[43]  In Holmes v. South Carolina,132 the Supreme Court struck down a 
state court precedent that would have blocked evidence of third party guilt 
based on the strength of the prosecution’s case.133  Holmes was on trial for 
murder and proffered testimony of witnesses who put another suspect in 
the victim’s neighborhood at the time of event.134  These witnesses would 
have testified that this alternate suspect either confessed or admitted that 
Holmes was innocent.135  However, the United States Supreme Court 
noted that South Carolina Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Gregory,136 
deprived Holmes of the ability to present a complete defense: 
 
                                                 
125 October Term 2008 runs from Oct. 6, 2008 through Sept. 5, 2009.  2008 Term 
Opinions of the Court, Supreme Court of the United States, 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08slipopinion.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
126 Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. 
Osborne, 521 F.3 1118 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 488 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2008) 
(No. 08-6). 
127 Id.  
128 See David Stout, Supreme Court to Review DNA Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2008. 
129 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 126, at (i).  
130 See generally Ken Strutin, Third Party Culpability DNA Evidence,  N.Y. L.J., Oct. 4, 
2005, at 4 (explaining the efficacy of retesting DNA evidence will depend upon a 
reexamination of longstanding discovery, testing and admissibility rules).  
131 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
132 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
133 Id. at 331.  
134 Id. at 323.  
135 Id.  
136 16 S.E.2d 532 (1941). 
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[B]y evaluating the strength of only one party’s evidence, 
no logical conclusion can be reached regarding the strength 
of contrary evidence offered by the other side to rebut or 
cast doubt.  Because the rule applied by the State Supreme 
Court in this case did not heed this point, the rule is 
“arbitrary” in the sense that it does not rationally serve the 
end that the Gregory rule and other similar third-party guilt 
rules were designed to further. Nor has the State identified 
any other legitimate end that the rule serves. It follows that 
the rule applied in this case by the State Supreme Court 
violates a criminal defendant’s right to have “‘a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense.’”137 
 
[44]  Shortly after Holmes was decided, the Tennessee Court of Criminal 
Appeals heard the arguments of Sedley Alley,138 a man sentenced to death 
for murder, kidnapping and rape, 139 who sought access to DNA testing to 
show that someone else was responsible.140  The Sixth Circuit had already 
denied his § 1983141 motion for testing, finding no constitutional right of 
                                                 
137 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 331; see Gregory, 16 S.E.2d at 543.  
138 Alley v. State, No. W2006-01179-CCA-R3-PD, 2006 WL 1703820, *1 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. 2006). 
139 His appeals were ultimately unsuccessful and he was executed shortly after this 
decision.  Melissa McNamara, Tenn. Executes 2nd Person in 45 Years, CBS NEWS, June 
28, 2006, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/national/main1758849.shtml.  
140 Id.  
141 42 U.S.C. § 1983:  
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s 
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 
 
Id. 
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post-conviction access to DNA evidence.142  Finally, the Governor of 
Tennessee granted a reprieve, allowing Alley to make a motion in state 
court for DNA testing.143  
 
[45]  Alley asked that underwear found near the victim, a stick used in the 
attack, and samples of genetic material from under the victim’s 
fingernails, as well as about a dozen other items be tested.144  He believed 
that “redundant results”145 would exculpate him.  And at the same time, he 
claimed that “DNA testing results could be entered into CODIS or a state 
DNA database and score a ‘hit’ to a convicted offender, thus not only 
exonerating Mr. Alley, but also identifying the actual assailant.”146  The 
“assailant” might have been someone in CODIS, or a new suspect.147 As 
discussed in the section below on reciprocal evidence, it appears that there 
is a constitutional argument supporting a balance of access rights. 
 
[46]  Despite Alley’s reliance on Holmes, the state court denied his claim 
as insufficient under Tennessee’s Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act.148  
It found that Act to be limited to comparing a defendant’s DNA to crime 
related evidence.149  The court rejected: “any implied testing of third party 
individuals or the need to ‘run’ DNA testing results through a DNA 
database for ‘hits.’  Indeed, other states have rejected requests to compare 
DNA profiles with state and national DNA databases as ‘add[ing] yet 
another layer of speculation.’”150  Rejecting the idea that the statute 
created a liberty interest, the court did concede: “Any interest created by 
enactment of the Act created a limited interest of a defendant in 
                                                 
142 McNamara, supra note 139.  
143 Alley, 2006 WL 1703820, at *1. 
144 Id. at *3.   
145 Id.  Redundant results are: “DNA tests results that establish the same genetic profile 
on a number of probative items of evidence.”  Id. 
146 Id.  
147 When a defendant claiming innocence seeks the genetic identity of an alternate 
suspect through discovery, in essence, it is no different than when a prosecutor files a 
John Doe DNA warrant to secure an indictment based on genetic material alone.  See 
Veronica Valdivieso, DNA Warrants: A Panacea for Old, Cold Rape Cases, 90 GEO. L.J. 
1009, 1009 (2002). 
148 Alley, 2006 WL 1703820, at *16.  
149 See id. at *5.  
150 Id. at *9 (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 889 A.2d 582, 586 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2005)). 
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establishing his/her innocence and did not create an interest in establishing 
the guilt of a speculative and unknown third party.”151  The court would 
not accept an expansion of testing beyond confirming or negating Alley as 
the source of the DNA.152 
 
[47]  The arguments made by Alley, including one grounded on actual 
innocence,153 might be redeemed depending on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Osborne this term.  Already, several Circuit Courts of Appeals 
have recognized a federal constitutional right to post-conviction DNA 
testing broader than most state statutes.154  The next step will be to justify 
expanding that right to encompass investigation of third party or alternate 
suspects.  
 
[48]  The federal and state DNA databases can serve two ends.  Discovery, 
on the one hand, is imperative to enable defendants to successfully raise 
                                                 
151 Id.  
152 Id. at *24.  
153 Id. at *10 (holding that there was no authority to consider a Herrera innocence claim 
based on evidence outside the trial record).  At best the state DNA statute provided a 
gateway motion for potential future innocence claims.  See generally Garrett, supra note 
117 (discussing the case of House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) and subsequent claims of 
innocence based on DNA); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
55 (2008) (examining the types of evidence that lead to wrongful convictions and later 
exonerations through DNA).  
154 See generally David A. Schumacher, Comment, Post-Conviction Access to DNA 
Testing: The Federal Government Does Not Offer an Adequate Solution, Leaving the 
States to Remedy the Situation, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1245, 1246-47 (2008): 
 
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether post-conviction claims 
are cognizable under § 1983, and the federal circuit courts of appeals 
are split on the matter.  The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals have all held that an inmate seeking to challenge a conviction 
through DNA evidence does not have a cognizable claim because a § 
1983 lawsuit amounts to a direct attack on the legitimacy of the 
conviction. [¶]  Four other circuits have gone the opposite way.  The 
Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, as 
well as district courts residing in two circuits that have yet to speak on 
this issue, have held that while an inmate has a cognizable claim for 
access to DNA testing under § 1983, the process for release must still 
be found in a subsequent habeas corpus lawsuit. 
 
Id. 
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claims of third party responsibility and exonerate themselves.  On the 
other hand, access is necessary to challenge the validity of database output 
used as prosecution evidence.  There has been litigation to gain access to 
the FBI database to test its accuracy and the validity of the statistical 
conclusions underlying its matches.155  There is also the capital 
prosecution case of Juan Luna, who was accused of participating in a 
multiple homicide at a Chicago eatery.156 
 
[49]  A Cook County judge granted a discovery request (subpoena) from 
Luna and ordered the Illinois State Police Forensic Science Center to give 
the defense limited access to the DNA profile database.157  “Luna’s 
defense team [was] hoping the DNA database information [could] help 
them poke holes in prosecutors’ assertions that DNA matching Luna with 
a chicken dinner at the crime scene [had a] more than a 1 in 1 trillion 
chance of being someone other than Luna.”158 
 
[50]  The prosecutors claimed that Luna’s DNA matched genetic material 
taken from a chicken bone found at the crime scene, because Luna’s DNA 
matched nine out of thirteen genetic loci,159 a match whose occurrence in 
                                                 
155 See, e.g., Jennifer Friedman, Release State DNA Profiles, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2008, 
at 2 (referring to a letter to the Editor from a Los Angeles County Public Defender 
pointing out the need for academics to vet the state databank to assess the accuracy of 
statistical profiling). 
156 See Now, Another Kind of Waiting Begins, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Jan. 8, 2003, at 1 
(reporting on a five part series about the case before trial). 
157 Kara Spak, Defense in Brown’s Chicken Case Gets DNA Access, CHI. DAILY HERALD, 
Aug. 15, 2006, at 13. 
158 Id. 
159 See generally Chris Smith, Anatomy of a DNA Match, S.F. MAG., Sept. 2008, 
http://www.sanfranmag.com/story/anatomy-dna-match: 
 
In 1997, FBI scientists decided on a predetermined set of 13 loci that is 
enough to indicate identity; most experts agree with that standard.  It’s 
generally believed that only identical twins match at 13, and that the 
chances of a coincidental 13-locus match—meaning it’s all a terrible 
mistake and the defendant is innocent—is, on average, one in a trillion. 
 
Id.; HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, DNA FORENSICS, 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/forensics.shtml  (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2009):  
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the Hispanic population was one in 2.8 trillion.160  Inspired by the results 
of an Arizona study, Luna wanted the raw data to find convicted felons 
who met the nine out of thirteen loci.161 
 
[51]  The court fashioned a compromise: the defense was not given access 
to the raw data, but the police would have to run a nine-loci analysis.162  
An appeal was pursued because the prosecution claimed that running the 
study would violate federal and state laws by using the database for an 
extra legal purpose.163  The defense countered that it was in the same spirit 
as statutorily authorized quality assurance testing of crime laboratories.164  
The prosecutors pointed out that smaller public databases (with up to 
17,000 profiles) were available for testing.165  According to Luna’s 
defense team, this would hardly compare with the 220,000 profiles in the 
state database.166  
 
[52]  The right to confrontation is directed at the sources of evidence the 
prosecutor has marshaled against the defendant—not a second tier 
substitute.  Courts are always concerned about the authenticity and 
originality of evidence, and take pains to exclude hearsay and secondhand 
information.  Thus, there is no rational basis for shielding the data in the 
government’s computer, and relegating the defense to run studies, likely 
inadmissible, on private sources that are not fair representations. 
                                                                                                                         
To identify individuals, forensic scientists scan 13 DNA regions, or 
loci, that vary from person to person and use the data to create a DNA 
profile of that individual (sometimes called a DNA fingerprint).  There 
is an extremely small chance that another person has the same DNA 
profile for a particular set of 13 regions. 
 
Id. 
160 See Brian Mackey, Court Allows Defendant’s DNA Data Request, CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL., Aug. 15, 2006, at 1. 
161 Id.  
162 Id.   
163 Id.   
164 Id.  
165 Id.  
166 Id. Eventually, Luna was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. His case is 
currently on appeal.  See Eric Herman, Brown’s Murderer Gets Life In Prison, CHI. SUN 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2007, at 10; Stacy St. Clair, State Police Lauded For Saving Evidence, 
CHI. DAILY HERALD, Oct. 17, 2007, at 21 (“After Luna’s murder trial, jurors said the 
DNA evidence played a key role in their decision to convict.”). 
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[53]  The Arizona study noted above was an important basis for the 
defendant’s application in Luna. 167  It arose from a discovery by an 
analyst working at the Arizona crime laboratory in 2001.168  She found 
two felons who matched at nine of thirteen loci, but was disturbed by a 
comparison of their mug shots—one African-American, the other 
Caucasian.169  Dozens of similar matches were uncovered.170  This 
revelation threatened to undermine the quality of statistical matching 
relied on by federal and state authorities and raised the specter of higher 
numbers of false matches.171  
 
[54]  Since then, the study has spurred defense requests for “Arizona 
Searches” as in Luna.172  For example, a San Francisco lawyer defending a 
rape case based on a nine-loci match was intrigued enough by the Arizona 
study to subpoena new results.173  “Among about 65,000 felons, there 
were 122 pairs that matched at nine of 13 loci.  Twenty pairs matched at 
10 loci. One matched at 11 and one at 12, though both later proved to 
belong to relatives.”174  In a Maryland death penalty case the court ordered 
a quality assurance test of the state’s DNA database at the defense’s 
request.175  “In a database of fewer than 30,000 profiles, 32 pairs matched 
at nine or more loci.  Three of those pairs were [perfect matches,] identical 
at 13 out of 13 loci.”176  Finally, academics and experts have added their 
voices in calling for access to the DNA databanks to test the assumptions 
of profile rarity.177 
                                                 
167 See Jason Felch & Maura Dolan, Crime Labs Finding Questionable DNA Matches: 
FBI Tries to Keep National Database Away from Lawyers, S.F. GATE, Aug. 3, 2008. 
168 Id.  
169 Id.  
170 Id.  
171 Id. (“At the time, [many] states looked at [only] nine or fewer loci when searching for 
suspects.  (States now commonly attempt to compare 13 loci, though often fewer are 
available from old or contaminated crime scene evidence.)”). 
172 Id.  
173 Id.  
174 Id. 
175 Id.  
176 Id. 
177 Maura Dolan & Jason Felch, The Verdict is Out on DNA Profiles, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 
2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/20/local/me-dna20. 
 
Bruce Weir, a statistician at the University of Washington who has 
studied the issue, said these assumptions should be tested empirically in 
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VI.  CONFRONTING COMPUTER DATABASE EVIDENCE 
 
[55]  Databases can serve as an investigative tool for the defense, as in the 
Luna case.  They can also be used to challenge database results presented 
by the prosecution during its case-in-chief.  Here, we must consider the 
government’s constitutional burden of proof, the defense’s right to 
confrontation, and the limited remedies available under the codes of 
procedure.  From a due process standpoint, it might be argued that certain 
kinds of database evidence, proven unreliable or inaccessible, ought to be 
categorically excluded.178 
 
[56]  One foundation of a demand by the defense for database discovery is 
the right to confront the witnesses against the accused.179  Confronting 
database output means questioning the entire system: data collection, 
entry, storage, retrieval, analysis and production.  Civil litigation e-
discovery has shined a light in the dark corners where information can 
hide, such as in metadata, and on the need to determine authenticity and 
authorship, which can change with each incarnation of a document or data 
record.180  
                                                                                                                         
the national database system.  “Instead of saying we predict there will 
be a match, let’s open it up and look,” Weir said.  Some experts predict 
that given the rapid growth of CODIS, such a search would produce 




178 See generally Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Why a Conviction Should not be 
Based on a Single Piece of Evidence: A Proposal for Reform, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 43 
(2007) (listing types of evidence prone to such mistakes and proposing future 
preventative legislation); Rory K. Little, Addressing the Evidentiary Sources of Wrongful 
Convictions: Categorical Exclusion of Evidence in Capital Statutes, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009) (citing polygraph evidence as one longstanding example, and 
pointing out several categories of evidence proven unreliable in wrongful conviction 
cases, such as junk science). 
179 Although the right to confrontation has primarily been viewed as a trial right, “there 
might well be a confrontation violation if . . . a defendant is denied pretrial access to 
information that would make possible effective cross-examination of a crucial 
prosecution witness.”  Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 61-62 (1987) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
180 Metadata in particular can be useful in clarifying the relationships among documents 
through pathnames and file storage architecture, version and drafting dates, and the other 
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[57]  Law enforcement, and particularly government forensic witnesses, 
sometimes rely upon analysis and data garnered from institutional 
knowledge, and in some cases specialty databases.  In a heroin smuggling 
case from the early 1980s, the defendant was charged with transporting the 
narcotic in caviar tins.181  A chemical analyst employed by the government 
testified that the substance recovered was heroin.182  The bases for his 
opinion were laboratory tests and computer analysis.183  Cross-
examination at trial revealed that “he [the expert] knew nothing about the 
computer program which caused the computer to bring forth the 
information it produced.”184 
 
[58]  The defense made a confrontation clause argument: without 
disclosure of the technical information on how the computer worked, they 
could not effectively cross-examine the prosecution’s witness.185  The trial 
court judge rejected this argument, finding that the defense had ample 
information to attack the weight of this expert’s opinion and the technical 
information would not have added to it.186  On appeal, the defendant 
emphasized the importance and value of obtaining that computer 
information pretrial.187  The Seventh Circuit, however, was not persuaded, 
and found that the testimony did not introduce “computer printouts or 
direct testimony of results.”188  Instead, the expert had relied on 
“recognized instrumental techniques involving the use of a computer.”189  
In the court’s eyes, the fact that the machinery involved was commercially 
or commonly used deflated the defense’s argument.190 
 
                                                                                                                         
points on the information cycle, and this type of nuanced discovery can easily be 
overwritten by failure to preserve the evidence in its original format or through 
purposeful document scrubbing.  See generally Douglas L. Rogers, A Search for Balance 
in the Discovery of ESI Since December 1, 2006, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8 (2008) 
(proposing ways in which the discovery phase may become more manageable). 
181 United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 172 (7th Cir. 1982). 
182 Id. at 176.  
183 Id.   
184 Id.  
185 Id.  
186 Id. at 176-77.   
187 Id. at 177.  
188 Id.  
189 Id.  
190 Id. at 176-77.  
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[59]  The direct evidence versus supporting role of computer-generated 
evidence test does not carry much weight today.  Challenges to the 
reliability of computer software governing the operations of some of the 
most commonly used forensic technology, such as breathalyzers, have 
been gaining momentum and widening the doors of discovery.191 
 
[60]  The New Jersey case of State v. Fortin,192 illustrates how far these 
developments have come.193  Steven Fortin was among a group of suspects 
being investigated in the beating death of a woman who was killed en 
route to a local grocery store in Woodbridge.194  At the time, he had been 
living nearby.195  His connection to the case did not emerge until months 
later, when Maine State Police contacted Woodbridge law enforcement 
about Fortin, who was under investigation for sexually assaulting a 
trooper.196 
                                                 
191 See Ken Strutin, An Examination of Source Code Evidence, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 13, 2007, 
at 5. 
 
 Testing and analysis of source codes ought to be allowed to 
meet the requirements of due process. Since an accused is entitled to 
independently test physical and biological evidence, there is a 
compelling and essential need to question the proficiency of the 
machines that do the analyzing and measuring. This is particularly 
important when the evidence, whether time sensitive or consumed by 
examination, no longer exists.  
 When it comes time to face the output from an analysis by a 
computer driven machine, a human being has the right to know whether 
the inner workings of that witness are reliable. And every defendant 
ought to be entitled to examine those inner workings with the help of an 
expert.  
 These source code cases suggest the need for quality assurance 
and proficiency testing of computerized scientific equipment in the 
same vein as the protocols for forensic laboratories. Although 
sophisticated and impressive, computer programs should be answerable 
for their errors. 
 
Id. 
192 State v. Fortin, 843 A.2d 974 (N.J. 2004). 
193 Id. at 999 (denying admissibility of an expert’s testimony without a “reliable 
database” as proof of scientific reliability).  
194 Id. at 984-86.  
195 Id. at 985.  
196 Id. at 986.  
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[61]  Without matching genetic material or other forensic evidence, the 
police did not have much to connect Fortin to the New Jersey crime, 
except for the similarity in the modus operandi.197  The New Jersey 
prosecutors called upon the services of a retired FBI agent and “expert in 
violent sexual crimes,” Robert R. Hazelwood, to catalog the similarities 
between the crimes committed against the New Jersey and Maine 
victims.198  At trial he offered an opinion based on comparisons of various 
acts and injuries at the two crimes as to motive, modus operandi, and signs 
of ritual.199  Hazelwood concluded that he had not seen the same 
combination of ritualistic behaviors in his work over the course of his 
thirty-year career.200  He also stated that he had never seen the particular 
combination of modus operandi and ritualistic behaviors “in any other 
crime and I’ve never heard of it and I’ve never read of it.”201  
Hazelwood’s testimony was critical to identifying Fortin as the culprit.  
His analysis and comparison of the two assaults allowed the jury to infer 
that Fortin was responsible in the New Jersey case.202 
 
[62]  Before he could testify about his “uniqueness analysis,” the court 
ordered Hazelwood to disclose the database of cases that formed the 
foundation for his work.203  It was a precondition to admitting evidence of 
the methods of his crime comparison techniques and assessing the 
reliability of the information upon which he relied.204  The prosecution 
argued that the witness drew on his experience in law enforcement and did 
not have a list of cases, only the information cited in his curriculum 
vitae.205  Still, the admission of his testimony was predicated on the 
production of a reliable database for defense examination.206  His resume 
was insufficient for that purpose, and the court would not place the burden 
on the defense of combing through Hazelwood’s publications and citations 
to assemble a database from the 7,000 cases he investigated over his 
                                                 
197 Id.  
198 Id. at 987.  
199 Id.  
200 Id. at 988.  
201 Id.  
202 See id. at 998-99. 
203 Id. at 999-1000.  
204 Id. at 999. 
205 Id.  
206 Id.  
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career.207  The expert was in the best position to assemble that 
information, and without the database, there was no means for testing his 
conclusions at trial.208 
 
[63]  The investigative techniques underlying the “uniqueness analysis” 
had the “aura of science,” and thus justified subjecting it to the more 
rigorous requirements for the admission of scientific evidence.209  New 
Jersey’s Rule of Evidence 705210 empowered the judge to order an expert 
to reveal his underlying data as a condition of testifying, which the expert 
would have to disclose in response to cross-examination as well.211  The 
purpose behind the court’s original order was to ensure the reliability of 
the database upon which Hazelwood would offer testimony that might 
lead the jury to conclude Fortin was responsible.212  The court went on to 
describe the contents of this database:  
 
Hazelwood’s database should have consisted of violent 
sexual assault cases that he had investigated, studied, or 
analyzed during his professional career, and the peculiar 
modus operandi and ritualistic characteristics of those 
crimes.  Such a database would have provided some basis 
for verifying the frequency of sexual assaults in which 
perpetrators bite the faces or breasts of their victims, or 
                                                 
207 Id. at 1000.  
208 Id. (“We cannot agree with the trial court that Hazelwood’s reference to his 
experience, training, and education was a substitute for a ‘database of cases’ or that the 
failure to provide such case information only went to the weight to be given to his 
opinion, rather than its admissibility.”). 
209 Id.  
210 New Jersey Law Network, Rule 705: Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert 
Opinion; Hypotheses not Necessary, http://www.njlawnet.com/njevidence/705.html:  
 
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give 
reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, 
unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be 
required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. 
Questions calling for the opinion of an expert witness need not be 
hypothetical in form unless the judge in his discretion so requires. 
 
Id. 
211 Fortin, 843 A.2d at 1001. 
212 See id. at 998-99.  
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manually strangle them, or engage in high risk attacks, to 
name but a few of the characteristics Hazelwood found 
distinctive in this case.  If Hazelwood was correct about the 
unique combination of characteristics that the Gardner 
[Maine victim] and Padilla [N.J. victim] assaults had in 
common, the database would have strengthened and 
validated his conclusions.  The jury also was entitled to 
know if there were any flaws in his analysis.213 
 
[64]  The appellate judges, however, were not in a position to define the 
size of the database, only determining it must allow an “acceptable basis 
for comparison.”214  The trial court would have to hold a hearing to make 
that assessment.215  They concluded that it was reversible error for 
Hazelwood to testify without providing a reliable database to the defense 
beforehand.216 
 
[65]  In a California case where the police used a sex crimes database to 
establish the identity of the defendant through data correlation, the appeals 
court did not look kindly on the trial judge's uncritical admission of the 
evidence.217  In People v. Hernandez, Kenneth Hernandez was charged 
with committing several violent sex crimes involving two different 
victims.218  Crime analysis evidence from a police database called 
Sherlock219 showed that these cases involving unique modus operandi had 
                                                 
213 Id. at 1002. 
214 Id.  
215 Id. (“At that hearing, the trial court must determine what number of cases can be 
reconfigured within reason and what number of case comparisons are necessary to give 
the opinion validity.”). 
216 Id.  
217 See People v. Hernandez, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing the 
use of a computer system named Sherlock, which the court deemed “pseudo-scientific” 
testimony).  
218 Id. at 770.  
219 Id. at 771.  Sherlock is 
 
 “[A]n in-house database that was developed by crime analysis.  
It was defined by the sex crimes unit, variables that we capture in there.  
Information that is put into the sex crimes file is from a sex crimes log, 
which each case that is assigned to a sex crimes detective has very 
specific information that’s put down on a sex crimes log.  [¶] In turn, 
that log is given to us and we enter it, give it to a clerical support 
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not occurred before defendant moved into the searched area or since his 
arrest, which was central to his identification.220 
 
[66]  The defense opposed admission of the evidence as unscientific and 
lacking indicia of reliability, and because no discovery had been 
granted.221  Based on the analyst’s testimony, the trial judge let the 
evidence in.222  On appeal, however, the court was highly dubious of the 
foundations for the reliability of the database:  
 
[T]he challenge here boils down to the basic question of 
whether the sources of information for the data base [sic] of 
Sherlock’s system “were such as to indicate its 
trustworthiness.”  As noted earlier, the prosecutor argued 
the information in Sherlock was trustworthy because it was 
relied upon by the sex crimes detectives on a daily basis to 
do their jobs solving sex crimes.  Such explanation, which 
the trial court apparently accepted, completely ignores the 
fact the business records exception has been held 
inapplicable to admit police reports into evidence for the 
sheer reason such are or might be based upon the 
observations of victims and witnesses who have no official 
duty to observe and report the relevant facts (citations 
omitted).  The data base [sic] in Sherlock was taken from 
the sex crimes log prepared from the purported “relevant 
facts” from original police reports, whatever those may 
be.223  
 
                                                                                                                         
person in the crime analysis unit who then enters each item into the 
Sherlock system, into the Sherlock sex crimes files.”   
 The entries to Sherlock were generally done within three to 
four days after a reported sex crimes incident. 
 
Id. 
220 Id.  
221 Id.  
222 Id. at 773.  
223 Id. at 778-79 (citations omitted). 
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The Court of Appeals went on to note that putting information into a 
computer does not cloak it in reliability.224  The computer did not have the 
power to transform hearsay from police reports into nonhearsay 
evidence.225  
 
VII.  RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY: RESTORING BALANCE 
 
[67]  A level playing field is crucial in the Information Age.  Police and 
prosecutors have access to a widening array of surveillance tools and data 
from consumer and social networking technologies.226  In a Supreme 
Court of Louisiana decision from the 1980s, we can observe the 
importance of balancing access to information resources, albeit human.227  
 
[68]  In Kirk v. State, Philip Kirk, Jr. was charged with mail fraud in 
federal court.228  He, along with his attorney, brought an action in state 
court for declaratory and injunctive relief over a Louisiana statute that 
prohibited him from recording confidential conversations of adverse 
witnesses without their consent. 229 At the same time, law enforcement was 
free to do so.230  Basically, the defense wanted to prevent the authorities 
                                                 
224 Id. at 779.  
225 Id.  
226 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL (2005), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/foia/docs/elec-sur-manual.pdf (explaining technologies 
and procedures).  
227 See Kirk v. State, 526 So.2d 223, 226-27 (La. 1988) (reviewing a state court ruling 
mooted by defendant’s acquittal in a connected federal criminal action); id. at 227 
(Watson, J., concurring) (declaring the case moot from the outset).  
228 Id. at 224.  
229 Id.; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:322.1(A) (1990): 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, intentionally and without the 
consent of all parties to a confidential communication, to eavesdrop 
upon or record such confidential communication by means of any 
electronic amplifying or recording device, whether such 
communication is carried on among such parties in the presence of one 
another or by means of a telegraph, telephone, or other device. 
 
Id. 
230 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:322.1(D)(3) (1990) (“This Section shall not apply to the 
following: . . . A law enforcement agency or any of its authorized agents.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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from prosecuting him as a result of getting witness statements, necessary 
for the defense, in violation of the law.231 
 
[69]  The prosecutor already possessed records of conversations between 
defendant and these witnesses.232  Kirk and his lawyer claimed that the 
statute violated equal protection by exempting police but exposing the 
defense to criminal liability.233  The case against Kirk rested on an alleged 
plan between defendant and his employees to defraud Photon, Inc., the 
corporation for which they worked.234  Law enforcement had used these 
employees to record conversations with the defendant to build its case.235  
Kirk wanted his investigator to speak with these same witnesses to prepare 
an entrapment defense.236 
 
[70]  Nothing in the legislative history or case law suggested a justification 
for this imbalance.  The court concluded:  
 
It is as fundamentally unfair to prohibit a criminal 
defendant from obtaining evidence by electronic recording 
of conversations when the prosecutor is free to obtain such 
evidence by the same method, at least in the absence of any 
reasonable basis for the distinction.  Inasmuch as La. R.S. 
14:322.1 violates a criminal defendant’s constitutional right 
to equal protection of the law under both the federal and 
state constitutions, the statute cannot stand.237 
 
[71]  The accused should be able to use those tools relied upon uniquely 
by law enforcement and the prosecution in preparing a defense.  
Objections by the government run counter to its use of databases and the 
like in meeting its burden of proof.238  The defense is not in the same 
position as the state when it comes to marshalling electronic resources.239  
                                                 
231 Kirk, 526 So.2d at 224.  
232 Id. at 224.  
233 Id. at 225-26. 
234 Id. at 225. 
235 Id.  
236 Id.  
237 Id. at 227. 
238 Cf. United States v. Sheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 337-38 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting): 
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[72]  These reciprocal discovery and disclosure obligations are firmly 
rooted in the right to present a defense.  In Wardius v. Oregon,240 the 
Supreme Court overturned a conviction due to an invidious state alibi 
evidence rule that did not allow the defense reciprocal discovery of the 
state’s rebuttal witnesses. 241  Describing discovery as a “two-way street,” 
Justice Marshall made this point about due process:  
 
The State may not insist that trials be run as a “search for 
truth” so far as defense witnesses are concerned, while 
maintaining “poker game” secrecy for its own witnesses.  It 
is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge 
the details of his own case while at the same time 
subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning 
refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he disclosed 
to the State.242 
 
[73]  In footnote nine of its opinion, the Court anticipated the problem 
defendants today face in seeking discovery of government database 
information, while the defendant’s computerized data may already be 
known or uncovered through investigation by the prosecution.243  
                                                                                                                         
It is incongruous for the party that selected the [polygraph] examiner, 
the equipment, the testing procedures, and the questions asked of the 
defendant to complain about the examinee’s burden of proving that the 
test was properly conducted.  While there may well be a need for 
substantial collateral proceedings when the party objecting to 
admissibility has a basis for questioning some aspect of the 
examination, it seems quite obvious that the Government is in no 
position to challenge the competence of the procedures that it has 
developed and relied upon in hundreds of thousands of cases. 
 
Id.; Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) (“Just as a State may not apply an arbitrary 
rule of competence to exclude a material defense witness from taking the stand, it also 
may not apply a rule of evidence that permits a witness to take the stand, but arbitrarily 
excludes material portions of his testimony.”). 
239 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE AND TECHNOLOGY: A 
PROGRESS REPORT (1999), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/179003.pdf (studying the 
"disparities in resources and technological expertise" in public defense offices).  
240 412 U.S. 470 (1973). 
241 Id. at 472. 
242 Id. at 475-76.  
243 See id. at 476 n.9.  
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Specifically, the Court noted: “Indeed, the State’s inherent information-
gathering advantages suggest that if there is to be any imbalance in 
discovery rights, it should work in the defendant’s favor.”244 
 
[74]  The Court has stressed that the Constitution will trump a state 
evidence rule that denies a defendant the right to present his case or 
challenge the evidence.  In Chambers v. Mississippi,245 a hearsay rule that 
prevented introduction of exculpatory evidence of third party guilt 
violated due process;246 and a rule barring a co-participant’s testimony in 
Washington v. Texas,247 which would have allowed the prosecution to 
present that evidence, ran afoul of the compulsory process clause.248 
                                                 
244 Id.  
245 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973):  
 
Although perhaps no rule of evidence has been more respected or more 
frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable to the exclusion of 
hearsay, exceptions tailored to allow the introduction of evidence 
which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have long existed.  The 
testimony rejected by the trial court here bore persuasive assurances of 
trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic rationale of the 
exception for declarations against interest.  That testimony also was 
critical to Chambers’ defense.  In these circumstances, where 
constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are 
implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to 
defeat the ends of justice. 
 
Id. 
246 In defense of a murder indictment, Leon Chambers wanted to call a man who had 
confessed the killing as well as the witnesses who heard his statement.  The state’s 
voucher rule prevented him from impeaching his own witness, and the testimony of the 
other witnesses to the admissions was hearsay.  Id. at 289-90.  The Supreme Court did 
not allow the defendant to be deprived of an opportunity to present his case due to an 
overly restrictive state rule of evidence.  Id. at 302.  
247 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967):  
 
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their 
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, 
the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the 
prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.  Just as 
an accused has the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the 
purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his 
own witnesses to establish a defense.  This right is a fundamental 
element of due process of law. 
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[75]  Both cases illustrate the constitutional imperatives behind a 
defendant’s right to marshal evidence in his favor, albeit outside the 
restrictions of inequitable state evidentiary rules.  Restrictions on 
accessing government databases due to privilege and privacy arguments 
cannot reasonably overcome due process and compulsory process 
mandates.  The contents of a database, like an alternate suspect’s 
confession to witnesses or the admissions of a convicted co-defendant, can 
be relevant to innocence and cast doubt on the strength of the 
prosecution’s case.  The collective knowledge embodied in government 
resources stand behind police and forensic witnesses, and indirectly serves 
as testimony against the accused.  Basic fairness demands that these 
databases also be called into service for the defense. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
[76]  At one time, when it was possible for a human being to master the 
entire sum of knowledge in a field, such a person became an expert, a 
living database.  It is no longer realistic for any individual to match the 
speed, size and sheer power of computer-based information.  Law 
enforcement and forensic experts rely on these resources to conduct 
investigations, make comparisons, identify suspects and prepare cases for 
court.  Their findings are inextricably bound to the information contained 
in these knowledge banks.  As a matter of fairness, a defendant should be 
entitled to examine that same information to test its accuracy and 
reliability.  In addition, defendants should be permitted access to the same 
tools to conduct their own investigations and prepare their cases. 
 
                                                                                                                         
 
Id.  
248 Jackie Washington wanted to call his co-defendant in the crime, who had already pled 
guilty and had been sentenced to fifty years in prison, to exculpate him.  The Texas rule 
at the time would not allow it.  His attempt to introduce exculpatory evidence was kept 
out by a rule whose foundations were unsupportable.  See id. at 16-17.  Compulsory 
process was a firmly established right and entitled Washington to produce exonerating 
evidence in his defense.  See id. at 23.  
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[77]  The complexity of the law249 is mirrored by the staggering size, 
growth and depth of computer-generated data.250  In the Information Age, 
it is inevitable that digitally-based output will lionize the evidence 
assembled by law enforcement in the prosecution of crime.  As a result, 
the defense will labor under the heavy burdens of challenging 
presumptions of reliability and the aura of infallibility surrounding 
electronic data.  Routine access to forensic databases and government 
expertise, or comparable resources, remains beyond the pale for most if 
not all defendants, regardless of their financial standing.  While our justice 
system recognizes the strategic information advantage possessed by the 
prosecution, it has yet to adjust the playing field.  Ultimately, the 
foundational principles of the Constitution and the lessons drawn from the 
civil side of the legal system will be called upon to offer guidance in the 
continued development of criminal e-discovery. 
                                                 
249 See generally Paul Rosenzweig, The Over-Criminalization of Social and Economic 
Conduct, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Apr. 7, 2003, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/upload/40268_1.pdf:  
 
Estimates of the current size of the body of federal criminal law vary.  
It has been reported that the Congressional Research Service cannot 
even count the current number of federal crimes.  The American Bar 
Association reported in 1998 that there were in excess of 3,300 separate 
criminal offenses.  More than 40 percent of these laws have been 
enacted in just the past 30 years, as part of the growth of the regulatory 
state.  And these laws are scattered in over 50 titles of the United States 
Code, encompassing roughly 27,000 pages.  Worse yet, the statutory 
code sections often incorporate, by reference, the provisions and 
sanctions of administrative regulations promulgated by various 
regulatory agencies under congressional authorization.  Estimates of 
how many such regulations exist are even less well settled, but the 
ABA thinks there are “[n]early 10,000.” 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
250 SCHOOL OF INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEMS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, HOW MUCH INFORMATION? (2003), 
http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-
2003/printable_report.pdf (“In 1997, the largest database was Knight Ridder’s DIALOG, 
a text database, with 7 terabytes of storage, according to SearchDatabase.com.  As of 
2002, the world’s largest database is at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center which 
stores 500 terabytes of experiment data.”).  
